Intelligence, Artificial and Otherwise

Paul Dumouchel, Intelligence, Artificial and Otherwise, 2019, Forum Philosophicum, no. 2, 241-258. 

Abstract The  idea  of  artificial  intelligence  implies  the  existence  of  a  form  of intelligence that is “natural,” or at least not artificial. The problem is that intel-ligence,  whether  “natural”  or  “artificial,”  is  not  well  defined:  it  is  hard  to  say what,  exactly,  is  or  constitutes  intelligence.  This  difficulty  makes  it  impossible to measure human intelligence against artificial intelligence on a unique scale. It does not, however, prevent us from comparing them; rather, it changes the sense and meaning of such comparisons. Comparing artificial intelligence with human intelligence could allow us to understand both forms better. This paper thus aims to compare and distinguish these two forms of intelligence, focusing on three issues: forms of embodiment, autonomy and judgment. Doing so, I argue, should enable us to have a better view of the promises and limitations of present-day artificial intelligence, along with its benefits and dangers and the place we should make for it in our culture and society

Ce contenu a été mis à jour le 3 février 2020 à 14 h 47 min.